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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT B. MECHAM, et al. 
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO. 
Def~endant and Appellant, 
Case No. 5159 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY CO. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is from a judgment of foreclosure entered 
by the trial court in three cases which were, by stipulation 
of all parties to the actions, consolidated for trial. The 
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actions were filed by respondent, Utah Savings & Loan 
Association against Robert B. Mecham and others, one 
case No. 20591 is for the foreclosure of six separate mort-
gages executed by Robert B. Mecham and Ruth W. Mecham, 
his wife, on six separate properties in Utah County, in an 
area referred to and designated as the Schauerhamer area. 
The Schauerhamer area is not a plotted subdivision property 
( R.13 7) . There has been building of residences by Robert 
B. Mecham on twelve separate tracts in this area each desig-
nated by metes and bounds descriptions. However fore-
closure of mortgages is sought by respondent on but six of the 
twelve lots, which lots are the only ones affected by the 
savings and loan company's mortgages. The complaint for 
foreclosure of the six mortgages states six separate causes 
of action. The mortgages being foreclosed in the first five 
causes of action were recorded December 13th, 1956. 
(R. 141) The mortgage described in the sixth cause of 
action was recorded June 26th, 1957. $3,000 of the mort-
gage money was advanced on each mortgage by respondent, 
Utah Savings & Loan Association before any work had been 
done on the properties in the Schauerhamer area. (R. 141) 
Another case so consolidated is Civil No. 20,592 in 
which respondent seeks to foreclose four mortgages purport· 
edly executed by Robert B. Mecham and his wife. The 
complaint states four separate causes of action. This area 
is referred to and designated as the Rowley area, it also is not 
a plotted subdivision but each mortgage describes a tract by 
metes and bounds. Mecham constructed a house on each 
one of these four tracts. Each of the mortgages affected by 
this action were recorded on January 31st, 1957. 
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The third case so consolidated is Civil No. 20,575 in 
which respondent, seeks to foreclose twenty-four mortgages 
on twenty-four separate tracts. Each of these mortgages are 
purportedly executed by Robert B. Mecham and his wife. 
The complaint in this case states twenty-four separate causes 
of action. This area is referred to and designated as the 
La\ Iesa area. This area was not a plotted subdivision at the 
time of the recording of the mortgages (R. 138) and there-
fore each tract described in each mortgage is by a metes and 
bounds description. The description contained in these 
mortgages was the first time such description was used in any 
document (R. 139). The subdivision plat of this area was 
filed after considerable construction had taken place and 
after appellant's lien had been filed. The mortgages affect-
ing the properties in this area were recorded in three groups, 
eight of which were recorded February 5th, 1957, eight of 
which were recorded February 13th, 1957 and eight of which 
were recorded February 18th, 1957. 
D. Spencer Grow who is named as one of the cross de-
fendants in appellant's Counter-claim and cross claim for 
the foreclosure of appellant's lien is and was at all times 
pertinent to the three cases, a man of vast experience in the 
real estate mortgage and loan business ( R. 454). He is 
president of respondent corporation, Utah Savings & Loan 
Association ( R. 456) owning ninety per cent ( 90%) of its 
stock. Grow was president of Mid-Utah Construction Com-
pany named as another cross defendant by appellant., in 
which company Grow and his wife owned 90% of the stock, 
l\frs. Grow was Vice President and Secretary of this corpora-
tion ( R. 455-456) ; Grow was Vice President of Radio Sales 
Corporation in which company he and his wife owned 80% 
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to 85% of the stock, this company was also named a cross 
defendant by appellant; D. Spencer Grow was also President 
of Mortgage Insurance Corporation ( R. 504), Grow In-
vestment and Mortgage Company (R. 512) and Mid-Utah 
Broadcasting Company in each of which corporations he and 
his wife were controlling stockholders. Each of said com-
panies were named cross defendants by appellant in its 
counterclaim and cross claim. 
In addition to being a man of vast experience in the 
real estate and mortgage loan business, Grow had had con-
siderable experience in the building of homes prior to the 
entering into contracts with Robert B. Mecham for construc-
tion of homes in the named areas both as owner and as 
representative of loan institutions. ( R. 454) 
One out of every four mortgages made by respondent, 
was made to a corporation of which Grow was president 
( R. 490), and 95% of construction loans made by respond-
ent were made to Grows controlled corporations (R. 538). 
In August, 1955, Robert B. Mecham started construc-
tion of houses for Grow in an area designated as the Key-
ridge Heights area ( R. 14 7). Construction was continued 
from Keyridge Heights area into Keyridge Heights Plat "B" 
area adjoining Keyridge Heights until about October, 1956 
( R. 512-513) 0 Work was commenced in these areas before 
the mortgages on the properties were recorded ( R. 515). 
There were 58 houses to be built in Keyridge ( Ro 163) . 
Properties in Keyridge and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" were 
owned by several of Grow controlled corporations and build-
ing was financed by respondent, Utah Savings & Loan Asso-
ciation ( R. 528) o Mecham thought he was dealing with 
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\tr. Grow and did not know to begin with that he was deal-
ing with Grow corporations (R. 153). Some of the homes 
being built by Mecham for Grow in the Keyridge area are 
not yet finished ( R. 518). Mecham found' he was losing 
n1oney on Keyridge from the first house (R. 168). He was 
losing about $1500.00 a house (R. 172) and he so in-
formed Grow ( R. 17 4). It became necessary for one of 
Grow's companies, Grow Investment and Mortgage Company 
to spend money on the homes in the Keyridge area in order 
to bring some of these houses to a point of completion 
( R. 518). In addition to monies paid by Grow's companies 
to bring some of the houses to a point of completion it would 
take some $25,000 to $35,000 more to complete those houses 
being built by Mecham for Grow's companies under contract 
in the two Keyridge areas ( R. 522). Grow was aware of the 
fact that the houses contracted to be built by Mecham in the 
Keyridge areas were not completed ( R. 524-525). Grow 
did not know at any time during the year 1956 what portion 
of the contract price agreed to be paid by his companies to 
Mecham had been advanced (R. 525). 
While houses in Keyridge Heights also referred to as 
Keyridge, and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" which Mecham 
was building under contract for Grow's companies were 
being built were not being completed, and Grow having knowl-
edge of the fact that Mecham was losing money on his build-
ing for Grow in the two Keyridge areas, still respondent, 
through Grow made loans to Mecham of $89,000 on seven 
Schauerhamer area properties (R. 140, 528, 756). Grow 
made no investigation as to Mecham's financial ability to 
perform his agreements, neither did he inquire as to Mecham's 
financial condition ( R. 246, 516, 528, 531). Respondent 
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had no cut and dried procedure in making construction loans, 
as to financial requirements of a borrower, until recently 
( R. 536, 541 ) . 
The work in the Keyridge areas had not been completed 
at the time of the trial of the cases. Most of the workmen 
were moved by Mecham into the Schauerhamer area at the 
time that property was acquired ( R. 756). 
Grow told Mecham upon learning that Mecham was 
losing money on his buildings that he would let Mecham 
build 43 homes north of the Keyridge area using the same 
plans at a base price of $2000 to ·$3000 more than the price 
fixed on the Keyridge houses (R. 175). 
When loans were made on the LaMesa area by respond-
ent to Mecham, a service fee of $1350 was charged on each 
loan by respondent (R. 544). Upon an examination of re-
spondent company by the State Banking Department it was 
determined that such charge was not legal, therefore each of 
these 24 loans were credited with $1350. Respondent's 
foreclosure proceeding is based on each of the 24 LaMesa 
mortgages being reduced in principal by the sum of $1350, 
which sum is I 0% of the face of the mortgages ( R. 546-7). 
This credit made a total of $32,400.00 ( R. 549) which the 
borrower, Mecham, never did receive. On the day of the 
opening of the trial the credit to these LaMesa mortgages ,,·as 
entered by respondent ( R. 54 7). Six percent of the ten 
percent service fee held out by respondent on each mortgage 
in the LaMesa area was paid to Allied Properties, a Grow 
owned corporation for house plans ( R. 549). The plans 
were those used in the Keyridge areas ( R. 551) . 
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There was $30,000 advanced by respondent out of the 
La,lesa mortgage money before any work was done In 
that area (R. 250). 
Appellant, Ludlow Plumbing Supply Company was a 
supplier of plumbing materials and fixtures which were 
used in the construction of houses built by Robert B. Mecham 
in each area including Keyridge sometimes referred to as 
Key ridge Heights and Keyridge Heights Plat "B" ( R. 575) 
and in addition to having supplied plumbing materials and 
fixtures to each of the houses built in the areas affected by 
each of the actions herein above referred to and the two 
Keyridge areas, appellant furnished plumbing supplies and 
fixtures which were delivered to a stockpile on the Key-
ridge areas ( R. 57 4) which went into construction of houses 
on six other properties in the Schauerhamer area not affected 
by the mortgages being foreclosed on in case Civil No. 
20,591 ( R. 5 78) and also a tract on which one house was 
constructed in the city of Provo, Utah. ( R. 585). Other 
than the one property situated in the city of Provo, each of 
the other tracts are located in the Orem, Utah, area and in 
the same general area, the Keyridge and Schauerhamer area 
being two blocks apart are not contiguous to the Rowley, 
LaMesa area. The Keyridge, Schauerhamer area is located 
to the west of U. S. Highway No. 91 and the Rowley, LaMesa 
area is located to the east of that highway, about 2 miles 
from the Keyridge, Schauerhamer area Pltff. Ex. 41, 
Case 20575 (R. 594). Appellant having made delivery as 
instructed by Robert B. Mecham, the contractor, delivered 
its materials to but two areas as designated by the contractor 
where the materials were stockpiled by Mecham one of 
which was on the Key ridge area ( R. 5 78) not affected by 
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either one of the three actions before the Court and the other 
point of delivery was on the LaMesa area which property is 
affected by Case No. 20,575 (R. 557) (R. 580) (R. 626) 
from which points plumbing materials were taken by the em-
ployees of the contractor and used in each area as houses 
were made ready to receive such materials ( R. 579, 580). 
No designation as to where plumbing materials were being 
used and no segregation of accounts was made by Mecham 
(R. 579) and Mecham advised appellant that it was not 
necessary to designate the place where plumbing materials 
were being used and that it was not necessary to segregate 
accounts as it made no difference ( R. 622). 
Grow was on and about the properties from time to time 
and made no objection to the practice of materials being 
taken from Keyridge and LaMesa stockpiles and being used 
in the several areas (R. 612, 613). Having no record as to 
the amount and kind of materials and fixtures which went 
into each house and having supplied the same under one 
open account (R. 581), appellant filed its lien on all of 
the properties on which its materials were used. There was 
no new contract or account as delivery location was added or 
changed by Mecham (R. 580, 581). 
Appellant having been named as a party defendant to 
respondent, Utah Savings & Loan Association's mortgage 
foreclosure actions, answered in each case and filed its 
counterclaim and cross complaint praying for the foreclosure 
of its lien as to those properties affected by the mortgage 
foreclosure actions, seeking equitable relief under the equally 
aportionable rule, it not being possible to tell definitely what 
plumbing material went into each house (R. 613-616), and 
also seeking a judgment against respondent, Utah Savings 
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and Loan Association, and Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company, 
which companies appellant claims are the true owners of 
the properties affected by appellant's lien, the owners hav-
ing failed to furnish a performance bond as required by 
~ertion 14-2-2 UCA 1953. 
Appellant has another action pending, not now before 
thi~ court in which it seeks foreclosure of its lien as to those 
properties covered by its lien which are situated in the 
Keyridge area and not affected by these cases, that property 
not being described in any of respondent's mortgages being 
foreclosed. 
Robert B. Mecham named as a defendant in each of the 
actions now before this court who was the contractor and 
who constructed houses in each area affected, admitted the 
delivery by appellant and receipt by him of plumbing mate-
rials and fixtures in the amount claimed ( R. 581), he 
further admitted the correctness of the account ( R. 583), 
and that the account was one open account ( R. 579) 
( R. 597). Mecham admitted that delivery was made by 
appellant in accordance with instructions given by Mecham 
to appellant to two points of delivery one upon the Key-
ridge area, the other upon the LaMesa area and that upon 
delivery having been made by appellant to those points of 
delivery appellant had no control over the materials. He 
further admitted the taking of plumbing materials furnished 
by appellant from the points of delivery designated by him 
where they were stockpiled and admitted using same in each 
area as houses were made ready to receive those materials 
( R. 580). Materials were stockpiled before work was com-
menced on the LaMesa area. The evidence shows the build-
ing in the several areas was treated at all times as one project 
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in the ordering and use of materials received from appellant. 
(R. 578-579). Houses were not completed in one area 
before Mecham fanned out and moved into one of the other 
areas, but work was being carried on in all areas at one 
and the same time ( R. 203) ( R. 207). Appellant delivered 
materials to the Keyridge area as early as June 6, 1956 
(R. 633). 
When Mecham started the last seven houses in the 
Schauerhamer area he found he was getting himself out on 
a limb, ready to be sawed off. It was necessary to get new 
building, new work, and new money as fast as possible in 
order to pay bills on Grow's Keyridge properties (R. 303) 
and also on houses Mecham was building for Grow in the 
Schauerhamer area. (R. 214) (R. 236). It was a matter 
of paying old bills. Not all of the houses being built by 
Mecham in the Schauerhamer area have been completed. 
Robert B. Mecham, the contractor was broke and in 
order for him to continue building and to get financing for 
building it was necessary for him to fan out and get more 
properties which could be and which were mortgaged to 
respondent. (R. 301). Mecham had no monies with which 
to purchase the Rowley and LaMesa properties and admitted 
that while he took title in his name he was following instruc-
tions given him by D. Spencer Grow in so doing (R. 247). 
The monies used for the purchase of the Rowley and LaMesa 
properties were furnished by respondent through mortgages 
placed on the LaMesa properties { R. 233-R. 248). 
Grow did not request that Mecham make any segrega-
tion nor did he inquire of Mecham if he was making any 
segregation of materials going into the various areas 
(R. 612). 
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The mortgages were not entitled to he recorded as to the 
Lal\Iesa properties, the same not having been executed as 
required by the laws of Utah. Mecham and his wife did not 
appear before the notary public and acknowledge signing 
the same (R. 318). 
The trial court entered judgment for appellant as 
against Robert B. Mecham in the amount claimed by appel-
lant's lien and ruled that the lien of appellant was invalid, 
holding as its reason, appellant did not designate the amount 
of the lien claimed against each property. The trial court 
failed to enter judgment against the owners of properties 
who undisputedly engaged the services of Robert B. Mecham 
to build on their properties on their behalf even though it 
was admitted that no performance bond had been filed, as 
required by the laws of Utah. 
Respondent caused lien waivers to be prepared (R. 587) 
in which numerous properties were described, the lien wavers 
were furnished to appellant with a request to have same 
executed by appellant which appellant refused to do (R. 327) 
( R. 586). The properties described in appellant's lien are 
those properties described in the lien waivers. Appellant 
refused to sign the lien waivers because they included proper-
ties in the Keyridge area in addition to the other areas 
(Defts. Ex. 50 & Ex. 51) (R. 587). 
At the pre-trial and when appellant introduced its lien 
into evidence objection was made as to its validity by re-
spondent, because appellant had not specified the amount 
clain1ed as against each property. Appellant through its 
counsel stated that it would not designate the amount as 
claimed against each property at the trial because it could 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
not do so. Therefore as counsel stated, appellant claimed a 
lien in the full amount against each property, appellant hav-
ing delivered its materials as directed to but two areas. 
Appellant pleaded and urged the doctrine of estoppel to 
the claim of respondent as being prior in time and superior 
to the lien of appellant. 
There is very little conflicting and contradictory evi-
dence in the record insofar as the evidence is applicable to 
appellant's case. 
The trial court applied the apportionment rule in its 
decision in favor of lien claimants Masonry Specialties and 
Supply Co., Central Utah Block Co. and Geneva Rock 
Products Co. each as to their claimed lien against LaMesa 
area and as to Geneva Rock Products Co. as to both LaMesa 
and Rowley areas but refused to apply the same rule to the 
lien of this appellant. 
The trial court ruled that the mortgages affecting the 
LaMesa area were not mortgages for future advances. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DETER-
MINING THAT THE LIEN OF DEFENDANT AND AP-
PELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY COMPANY, 
IS INVALID AND THAT THE SAME IS INFERIOR TO 
THE LIEN OF THE MORTGAGES OF PLAINTIFF AND 
RESPONDENT, AND IN FAILING TO ENTER A DECREE 
FORECLOSING THE LIEN OF APPELLANT. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE 
BUILDING OF HOUSES IN EACH OF THE AREAS 
COVERED BY THE LIEN OF DEFENDANT AND AP-
PELLANT WAS TREATED IN ALL RESPECTS AS ONE 
ENTIRE PROJECT, AND THAT IT WAS ONE PROJECT 
INSOFAR AS THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANT IS AF-
FECTED. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM 
WAS AGENT FOR MID-UTAH BROADCASTING COM-
PANY, GROW INVESTMENT AND MORTGAGE COM-
PANY, AND RADIO SALES CORPORATION WHICH 
COMPANIES THROUGH ITS AGENT, D. SPENCER 
GROW CONSTRUCTED HOUSES IN KEYRIDGE 
HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION AND SCHAUERHAMER SUB-
DIVISION AND THAT SAID MID-UTAH BROADCAST-
ING COMPANY FAILED TO REQUIRE ROBERT B. 
MECHAM, THEIR AGENT, TO FURNISH A PERFOR-
MANCE BOND IN CONFORMITY WITH TITLE 14-2-2 
UCA, 1953, AND THEREFORE, SAID MID-UTAH 
BROADCASTING COMPANY BECAME LIABLE TO DE-
FENDANT AND APPELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING 
SUPPLY COMPANY FOR MATERIALS FURNISHED TO 
THAT PROPERTY AFFECTED BY CASE NO. 20,591 
DESIGNATED AS SCHAUERHAMER AREA. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO FIND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM TOOK TITLE TO 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
PROPERTIES DESIGNATED AS ROWLEY AND LaMESA 
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPOND-
ENT AND THAT RESPONDENT WAS THE REAL PARTY 
IN INTEREST AND THAT ROBER B. MECHAM WAS 
THE AGENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND· RESPONDENT AND 
THAT PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT FAILED TO 
REQUIRE ROBERT B. MECHAM, THEIR AGENT, TO 
FURNISH A PERFORMANCE BOND IN CONFORMITY 
WITH TITLE 14-2-2 UCA, 1953, AND THAT DEFEND-
ANT AND APPELLANT IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO 
PERSONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF AND RE-
SPONDENT AS THE SAME AFFECTS THE PROPERTIES 
SITUATED IN THE ROWLEY AND LaMESA AREAS. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE EQUAL APPORTIONABLE 
RULE. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND RE-
FUSING TO DECREE THAT THE MORTGAGES IN-
VOLVED IN EACH OF SAID ACTIONS WERE INVALID 
AS TO APPELLANT, LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY 
COMPANY, THE SAME NOT HAVING BEEN EXECUTED 
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO FIND THAT BECAUSE OF THE CONDUCT OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT IN EACH OF SAID 
ACTIONS PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT IS ES-
TOPPED FROM CLAIMING ANY RIGHTS AS BEING 
PRIOR AND SUPERIOR TO THE RIGHTS OF DEFEND-
ANT AND APPELLANT. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING AND DETERMINING 
THAT THE LIEN OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, 
LUDLOW PLUMBING SUPPLY COMPANY, IS INVALID 
AND THAT THE SAME IS INFERIOR TO THE LIEN OF 
THE MORTGAGES OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT, 
AND IN FAILING TO ENTER A DECREE FORECLOSING 
THE LIEN OF APPELLANT. 
Appellant's lien on which action was brought to fore-
close the same in the three cases consolidated for trial was 
introduced and received in evidence at the pre-trial hearing 
of the cases as consolidated for trial. Upon appellant 
offering the lien in evidence, objection was made by respond-
ent to the validity of the lien which objection was based on 
( 1) the lien fails to conform to the laws of Utah in that the 
properties are not separately stated, and ( 2) the lien fails to 
designate the amount claimed against any particular lot or 
property or any house referred to in the lien. 
The lien was received in evidence notwithstanding the 
fact that appellant's counsel stated that appellant would not 
and could not show the value and amount of the material 
which went into each house, this because appellant had no 
record neither did appellant have any control over the mate-
rials after they were delivered as directed by Mecham the 
Contractor, to two points of delivery where the materials 
'rere stockpiled and from which materials were taken by 
l\Iecham as houses were made ready in each area to receive 
the materials. 
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Approximately twenty days of trial did not bring out 
other or different evidence. 
The evidence shows and it was admitted by Mecham, 
the contractor, that he ordered the plumbing materials for ap-
pellant, that he used the same, some in each of the houses 
in each area, that he ordered the materials on one open ac-
count, that materials of the value charged for by appellant 
w.ere received by him and used in the houses in each area, 
and that the amount claimed as due and owing by appellant 
was correct. Mecham further admitted that appellant had 
no control over the materials after the same were delivered 
by appellant to stockpile as designated by him, that delivery 
was made by appellant under Mecham's orders and under his 
directions to the two points of delivery, one on the Keyridge 
area and one on the LaMesa area. He admitted that mate-
rials were taken from the stockpile in each area as houses 
were made ready to receive plumbing materials, that plumb-
ing materials were taken from the stockpile in Keyridge 
area and used in the two Keyridge areas, in the Schauerhamer 
area as that area was being built on, then in the Rowley 
and LaMesa areas as these two areas were being improved. 
Mecham also admitted that materials which were stockpiled 
in the rock building on the LaMesa area were not only used 
on the LaMesa area but also taken from that stockpile and 
used on the Rowley, Schauerhamer and Keyridge areas, and 
in a building in Provo, Utah, that building was going on in 
each area at the same time. Mecham further admitted 
that materials were delivered by appellant to the two points 
of delivery between those dates specified in the lien, there is 
no contradition as to these facts. Excerpts from the testi-
mony by Mecham as to same is as follows: (Page 579) 
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Q. Now, were these materials-plumbing ma-
terials received and ordered from Ludlow Plumbing 
Supply Company on an open account? 
A. Yes, they were. 
Q. Did you, as plumbing materials were being 
used from one area to another, instruct Mr. Allred 
or anyone else to make any designation or segregation 
of the accounts? 
A. No, we did not. 
Q. Did you, on your records, make any segre-
gation or designation of the accounts as to where 
plumbing materials were being used in the several 
areas and the various houses on those several areas? 
A. No. We didn't make any designation. 
Q. Did you give any orders to Mr. Allred or 
to anyone in your employment as materials were be-
ing taken from this stock pile to make any records 
as to where those materials were going? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Now, was there any discontinuance of stock 
piling in the Keyridge area? 
A. Yes, We changed our point of unloading to 
LaMesa after we had-after the construction was 
fairly well along in LaMesa. 
Q. Did you then direct where materials were to 
be delivered when you changed over to LaMesa? 
A. I instructed the plumbers to have a central 
place to unload the materials. I didn't direct the dis-
tribution to the various houses. 
Q. No. But you did direct them to have a lo-
cation, did you, on LaMesa? 
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A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. Were materials distributed, do you know, 
from those points of delivery to these other projects, 
or these other areas? 
A. They were on occasion. 
Q. Were materials delivered from the LaMesa 
area to Keyridge? 
A. Yes, they were in some cases. 
Q. Were materials delivered from LaMesa 
area-that is, plumbing materials to the Schauer-
harner area? 
A. In some rare occasions they were. 
Q. Were materials delivered from the LaMesa 
area to the Rowley area? 
A. Yes, some. 
Q. Now, when you made the change to-in-
struction to have deliveries made to the LaMesa area, 
did you have any new contract or agreement with 
Ludlows as to setting up a new account for that-for 
the delivery of those materials? 
A. No. We went on the same original ar-
rangement. 
Q. You carried on the same open account, did 
you? 
A. Yes, that is right. 
Q. That continued throughout the whole oper-
tion. Isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Was the same practice used in the distri-
bution of material from the LaMesa area to these 
other areas, insofar as the manner of not keeping 
records were concerned, as to where the materials 
were being used? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Did you instruct your men as they were 
taking materials-plumbing materials from the La-
Mesa area to mak~ any record as they were taking 
them, as to where those materials were being used? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. When materials were delivered by Ludlows, 
according to your instructions to your men, Mr. 
Mecham, did Ludlows have any control from thereon 
as to where they were to be used? 
A. No. They had no control. 
Respondent consistently argued at the trial of the case, 
and apparently convinced the trial court, that because ap-
pellan_t could not specify the materials which went into each 
house and the cost of same and further because appellant 
seeks to foreclose its lien as the same covers only that 
property affected by the three pending cases here before 
the court that appellant's lien is invalid. It is apparent that 
respondent confuses the foreclosure of a lien and the filing 
of a lien. Appellant was obliged to seek the application of 
the equitable equal a pportionable rule and thus seek recov-
ery of that portion of its lien in these actions which af-
rected that property liened and which is affected by the 
mortgages being foreclosed on by respondent, appellant hav-
ing been named as a defendant to respondent's foreclosure 
action and having been required to foreclose its lien as to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
those properties affected by respondent's mortgage in the 
same action. Appellant must look to recovery of the balance 
of its claim on other properties liened through actions sep-
arate and apart from the three cases here before the court, 
one of which is pending in the district court, as same covers 
those properties liened by appellant and not affected by 
these actions and not affected by respondent's mortgages here 
being foreclosed on. That is to say, appellant having furn-
ished plumbing materials to not only buildings on those 
lots covered by respondent's mortgages but also other lots 
in the same areas, which lots appellant liened, appellant 
can but look to that part of the property affected by the pend-
ing actions here before the court to satisfy that proportionate 
part of its lien which the property mortgaged and included 
in the pending actions bears to the total number of lots cov-
ered by appellant's lien. By appellant so doing appellant 
is not burdening a portion of the property affected by its 
lien with the whole amount of the lien. Respondent contends 
that the filing of a lien on each lot in the full amount 
of the lien is burdening each lot with the full amount of the 
lien, therefore the lien is invalid. True appellant's lien is 
in the total amount claimed against the whole of the proper-
ties. It could not be otherwise unless appellant could pos-
itively specify the amount represented by materials which 
went into each house. This it is evident is not possible. A 
portion of the testimony of Mecham regarding this fact is 
as follows: ( P. 613) 
Q. Now, Mr. Mecham, you stated in the ques-
tion propounded to you by Mr. Aldrich that you 
possibly could make an estimate of the plumbing ma-
terials that went into the houses on these several 
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projects. I will ask you, could you tell, or would 
you know which way the sewer ran from the house 
to the sewer line. 
A. Not definitely. In some cases, possibly. 
Many cases, have very little idea. 
Q. Then you would not know the length of the 
sewer line, would you? 
A. No. Not without digging it up. 
Q. Would you know the number of joints in the 
sewer line or in the water line? 
A. No. That would be impossible. 
Q. Would you know whether cast iron or tran-
sit pipe was used under ground? 
A. No. No way to tell. 
Q. As a matter of fact, there is a consider-
able difference in the cost of cast iron over transit 
pipe, isn't there? 
A. Yes. Cast is about twice as expensive as 
transit. 
Q. Do you know how much waste pipe had 
been broken or disappearing on the job? 
A. No. There is no way I could have known 
that. 
Q. Therefore, when you state that one might 
have an idea as to what went into a house, it would be 
guess work, would it not? 
A. There would be a considerable amount of 
guess work in it. 
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Q. There is no way of determining the exact 
amount after the materials have been placed in the 
houses, is there? 
A. None that I know of. 
Q. Do you know, Mr. Mecham, whether cast 
iron and transit pipe were used on those projects? 
A. Yes. They were both used. 
Q. Do you know which houses cast iron was 
used in and which houses transit pipe was used in? 
A. No. I am sorry I don't. 
Appellant's position is supported by the very recent 
case of Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. vs Santa Fe Land Co. 
handed down by the Supreme Court of Colorado on Dec. 8, 
1958 found in 332 P2d at page 892, which case Is very 
much in point. 
Brannan was a subcontractor engaged by Harris 
Constructors, Inc., the general contractor to surface and pave 
a 1567 foot roadway. The paved area was on and traversed 
three separate pieces of property one of which was owned 
by the Land Company and was constructed to extend the 
east lane of Quivas Street northward so as to connect with 
a newly constructed warehouse of Sears-Roebuck & Co., 
thus providing for ingress and egress from the latter's ware-
house to Quivas Street. After completion of the work 
the Land Company paid Harris Constructors, Inc., the gen-
eral contractor in full. The Harris Company was declared 
a bankrupt and none of the moneys paid to it were ever paid 
to Brannan. Brannan filed a lien upon the property of 
the Land Company for the full amount of the lien. But 
because the cost of the roadway could be apportioned on 
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a square foot basis among the three properties the court 
allo,red Brannan a lien on that portion of the property 
which belonged to the Land Company to the extent that 
the cost of the portion of the Land Company property bore 
to the whole job. In its opinion the court said: 
"First question to be determined: Does the Me-
chanics' Lien Statute supra, subject defendant in 
error's land to a lien for the entire contract price in-
volving improvements constructed on other lands? 
This question is answered in the negative. 
"Omitting the verbiage in 83-3-1 not pertinent to 
the ·question the statute provides: 
' ... subcontractors ... shall have a lien upon 
the property upon which they have rendered 
service or bestowed labor or for which they have 
furnished materials . . . for the value of such 
services rendered or labor done or materials 
furnished' 
"Brannan's counsel, did not attempt to claim the lien 
upon the whole roadway but filed only on the segment 
located upon the Land Company's property. By 
statute, therefore, the inquiry of the trial court was 
limited to determining what labor, services and ma-
terial were rendered by plaintiff to the property 
upon which the lien was claimed." 
It will be noted that section 83-3-1 of the Colorado Statute 
quoted from above is almost identical with section 38-1-3 
UCA 1953, which by omitting the verbiage as was done 
by the Colorado Court we find by comparison would read 
as follows: 
" ... subcontractors ... shall have a lien upon the 
property upon or concerning which they have ren-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
dered service, performed labor or furnished mate-
rials, for the value of the service rendered, labor per-
formed or materials furnished ... ". 
As has heretofore been pointed out, appellant is not 
asking this Court to satisfy the whole amount of its claim 
out of the properties affected by the three pending actions. 
It asks the court to satisfy that portion of the lien which the 
number of properties involved in the pending action bears 
to the total properties covered by its lien. This is a simple 
matter to be determined and the court in equity has the 
power to allocate an equal amount to each property when 
appellant does not have the right to do so because it had 
no record as to the materials furnished to each house. In 
support of this argument we refer to Jones on Liens, 
Volume II, section 1319, reading as follows: 
"A lien claim may be apportioned when practicable 
without the aid of any special statute for the purpose. 
In an action to enforce a lien for labor performed on 
two houses, the fact that the petitioner is not able to 
state the precise share of the labor performed on each 
house does not necessarily defeat altogether his re-
covery. The jury rna y sustain his lien against each 
house for such certain amounts of labor as they are 
satisfied he performed thereon, although they may 
not be satisfied that he did not perform more." 
This being an equity case a court of equity may appor-
tion the claim on an equal basis where the claimant itself 
cannot do so when the lien claimant is unable to specify 
with certainty that material which went into each building. 
This argument finds further support in Thompson on 
Real Property, Per. Ed. Vol. 10, Sec. 5432. p. 432 reading 
as follows: 
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"A materialman delivering lumber to two buildings 
may claim a lien on both, even though he may not be 
able to determine definitely what percentage of the 
lumber furnished by him was used in one building 
and what was used in the other." 
In the case of Sargison v Turner, 124 Pac. 379 we find 
~y llabus l reading as follows: 
"A builder who contracted for the construction of five 
dwelling houses, one to be built on a lot in which 
defendant had no interest, and who kept no separate 
accounts with the several buildings for labor and 
materials furnished in their construction could not 
assert a single lien against all the defendant's four 
houses." 
That is to say the lien claimant was obliged to assert his 
lien against the five houses for which labor and materials 
were furnished. 
A most interesting annotation is found on this subject 
in 130 ALR at page 424 in which the case of Badger Lum· 
her Co. v Holmes, 44 Neb. 244, 62 NW 446, 48 Am. St. 
Rep. 726 is quoted from as follows: 
"The failure of a mechanics' lienor to show the 
proportion of the materials furnished to each parcel 
under an agreement by which the lienor was to furn-
ish materials for the erection of buildings on each 
of six lots, which materials, when furnished, were 
used indiscriminately by the owner, was held ground 
for reversal of judgment decreeing a lien for the en-
tire balance due against less than all the parcels for 
the improvement of which materials were furnished. 
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The whole debt might be charged to all six lots but 
all the debt for all the material cannot be charged 
to a part of the lots." (Italics added) 
This same law is found in Jones on Liens Vol. II, 
Sec. 1315. 
Regarding this question appellant relies on the case 
of U. S. Bldg. & Loan vs Midvale Home Finance Corp. 
86 U. 506, 44 P2d 1090. It appears to be the controlling 
case in this state to date. 
A brief summary of the pertinent facts of the Midvale 
case is as follows: 
Early in 1930 a finance company undertook to pro-
mote the construction and sale of a large number of homes 
in Midvale, Utah, on a tract of land known as Lincoln Sub-
division. The land was platted into lots or units. In 
March of the same year construction work was begun. The 
lots or units were sold to various parties on contracts most of 
which contracts were either entered into prior to commence-
ment of construction or shortly thereafter. The contractor 
failed to carry out its contract and suit for the foreclosure 
of a mortgage by the mortgage holder was instituted against 
the contractor and lien claimants, also against the unit 
purchasers all of whom answered and cross complained. 
The court found for the lien claimants over the mortgage 
because the work and materials had been furnished prior to 
the filing of the mortgage. However the point which we 
contend is controlling in the instant cases is this. The unit 
holders urged that the liens filed by the lien clai1nants were 
fatally defective in that they failed to state the amount and 
value of materials and labor furnished to each unit, relying 
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on ~ection 3737 Compiled Laws of Utah 1917, now 38-l-8 
UCA 1953 ,,;hich provides: 
"Liens on several separate properties in one claim-
Liens against two or more buildings, mining claims 
or other improvements owned by the same person or 
persons may be included in one claim; but in such 
case the person filing the claim must designate 
therein the amount claimed to be due to him on each 
of such buildings, mining claims or other improve-
ments." 
In the Midvale case the court said: 
"It is next urged by the unit holders that the liens 
filed by the lien claimants are fatally defective in that 
they fail to state the amount and value of materials 
and labor furnished to each unit. Our attention is 
directed to Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 3737, now 
R. S. Utah 1933, 52-1-8. It is there provided: 
'Liens against two or more buildings, mining claims 
or other improvements owned by tlie same person or 
persons may be included in one claim; but in such 
case the person filing the claim must designate therein 
the amount claimed to be due to him on each of such 
buildings, mining claims or other improvements.' 
"A similar question was involved in the case of 
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah, 241, 87 P. 
713, 714. The law with respect to the acquisition and 
enforcement of mechanics' liens was substantially the 
same at the time herein involved as it was at the time 
the rights of the parties attached and the decision was 
rendered in the Eccles Lumber Company Case. The 
unit holders attempt to distinguish that case from the 
case in hand upon the ground that in the former case 
the two houses had not been sold to two different 
persons, while in the instant case the unit holders 
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have contracted in severalty for the purchase of the 
lands in question." 
It is the contention of appellant that the same rule of 
law applies in the present cases as applied in the Midvale 
case. 
In the instant case appellant delivered materials to 
Mecham under one contract and on one open account. 
It is the delivery of materials under a single contract 
which determines the question whether several lots are sub-
ject to a lien and not the location of the lots or the matter of 
ownership, and the lots need not be contiguous as was the 
holding by the Kansas Court in Golden Belt Lumber Co. 
v McLean, reported in 26 P2d at page 27 4 in which we find 
paragraph one of the syllabus reading as follows: 
"Where materials or labor are supplied under single 
contract for construction of improvements on non-
contiguous town lots, single lien statement timely 
filed created lien on all lots." 
The evidence in the instant cases shows that materials 
were used indiscriminately by the contractor, Mecham, and 
Grow the agent of respondent was aware of the manner in 
which materials were being so used. Grow made no ob-
jection to the method adopted by Mecham at any time during 
the construction of houses in each area. There was no segre-
gation of plumbing materials as to any particular lots in 
any of the areas. 
Our own state law, Sec. 38~1-4 UCA 1953 Is to the 
same effect, it provides: 
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"AMOUNT OF LAND AFFECTED-LOTS AND 
SUBDIVISIONS - MINES- FRANCHISES, FIX-
TURES AND APPURTENANCES. 
"The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to and 
cover so much of the land whereon such building, 
structure or improvement shall be made as may be 
necessary for the convenient use and occupation there-
of, and in case any such building shall occupy two or 
more lots or other subdivisions shall be deemed one 
for the p-urpose of this chapter; . . " (Italics sup-
plied) 
It appears the above section has not been construed by 
our Court except as to mining claims. 
In Warrenton Lumber Co. v Smith, 117 Or. 530, 
245 Pac. 313 it is said by the Court: 
"A materialman who furnishes material for several 
disconnected houses built under one entire contract 
has a lien in gross against all of the houses, and need 
file but one notice including all." 
In Sprague lnv. Co. v Mouat Lumber Co., 14 Colo. 
App. 197, 60 Pac. 179, cited in 10 ALR at page 1027 
we find the following: 
"It appeared that under a single contract three houses 
were built over four lots of land, owned by the same 
person. Holding that a single lien was valid, the 
court said: 
'Where, however, there is practically no segre-
gation of the lots, and no description of the 
land on which the houses are built in the convey-
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ances, so that the lienors may be advised re-
specting it, and where, also, the proof is, as 
here, the lumber went into the houses indiscrimi-
nately, it cannot be true the lienor must at his 
peril subdivide his claim and assign to each 
house as built, the proportion of the debt which 
it ought in equity to bear. The evidence shows, 
and the court found, the material was delivered 
from time to time from November, 1892, until 
June 27, 1893,-delivered sometimes at the 
houses, sometimes at Freeman's shop on vacant 
lots to the north of the property. Some of the 
material went into one house, some into another, 
and it was impossible by any means known to 
dealers in material to ascertain which house the 
lumber or the materials went into. Since this 
is true, the case is brought clearly within the 
decisions of this court'." 
While we recognize in the Sprague case there was one 
owner still we think the law as therein handed down is 
applicable. 
It is trusted the Court will adopt and apply the 
law as has been contended for herein, however, should 
the Court not be inclined to do so then we rely on those 
cases cited in 57 CJS Mechanics' Liens, Sec. 43 at page 
535 wherein the case of East End Lumber Co. v. Bennett, 
187 NE 786, 46 Ohio App. 104 is found from which the 
following statement is quoted: 
"One who delivers material to an owner ·s contractor 
on the premises rna y be entitled to a lien therefore 
although the material is delivered to another project 
by the contractor." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
See also Houston Fire & Casualty Inc. Co. vs. Hales 
(Texas) 279 SW2d 389 in which the court said: 
"Where a materialman furnishes materials to a 
building for a specific construction job, it is not re-
quired in order to establish a lien that the materials 
should actually enter into the construction, and the 
lien cannot be defeated by proof that a part of the 
material was used for other jobs. 
This rule of law was followed by our own court In 
Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. vs. Whitmore 240130, 66 P. 779. 
In the Houston case the facts are quite similar to the 
instant case. There the supplier furnished materials to be 
used on either one project or another, he was not certain 
which job the materials were used in as the contractor was 
doing two jobs at the same time. 
And in Drake Lubr. Co. v Paget Mortgage Co., Oregon., 
27 4 P2d 804, 811 a case where it was evident that it was 
difficult for the materialman to make a strictly accurate 
statement because materials furnished for one job were used 
in another and in which the court said: 
"The difficulty which it (materialman) encountered 
in arriving at a strictly accurate statement was not 
of its own making, but arose from the use by the con-
tractor in one house of materials furnished for use 
in another. This Drake could hardly have prevented 
for it cannot be expected that a materialman would 
be obliged to watch the progress of a structure, to see 
that every stick of timber or other material so supplied 
by him was used therein." 
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The doctrine adopted by the courts as is reflected by 
the above cases shows the widely accepted rule and the 
one adopted by the Utah courts. An interesting discussion 
of this doctrine may be found in 39 ALR 2d at page 398. 
It is admitted in the instant case however that the 
materials were used in the properties liened. 
LOOSE DESCRIPTION 
The lien filed by appellant affects more property than 
it appeared from the evidence houses were built upon. This 
discrepency was not brought about by appellant but by 
respondent who furnished the descriptions of that property 
which respondent requested a lien waiver on. A comparison 
of the description of the property contained in the lien will 
show it to be that same property as is described in the 
form of lien waiver which respondent sought to have exe-
cuted by appellant. Certainly respondent at the time 
considered appellant to have lien rights as against that 
property described in the lien waiver, if not why the lien 
waiver? 
The evidence shows respondent to have caused the lien 
waiver to be prepared and that Mr. Grow discussed the same 
with representatives of appellant company when Grow en-
deavored to pursuade appellant's representative to execute 
the waiver which appellant refused to do because the waiver 
covered property on which appellant claimed a lien other 
than the LaMesa properties. 
We find in footnote to Sec. 38-1-3 UCA 1953, the 
Annotators cite the Iowa case of Fruden Lumber Co. v Kinnan, 
117 Iowa, 93, 90 NW 515 as follows: 
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"It is the furnishing of material for a building which 
entitles a party to a lien, and its actual use in the 
construction thereof need not be shown." 
It developed during the trial that the description con-
tained in appellanfs lien covered properties not improved, 
also properties on which no materials were furnished by 
appellant and also some properties which had been released 
from claim of lien on the part of the appellant. It is further 
evident that these mistakes were innocent mistakes, not 
caused through any fault of appellant but as has been 
heretofore said, appellant relied on those descriptions of 
the properties used by respondent and contained in the lien 
waiver. 
The court said In the Golden Belt case, supra as to 
such defect: 
"Inclusion of town lot on which no materials or serv-
ices were used in lien statement does not invalidate 
lien so far as it relates to other lots on which mate-
rials or services were used, but such lot should be 
excluded from lien on rendition of judgment." 
Reference is also made to the case of Caird Engineer-
ing Works v. Seven Up Gold Mining Co., (Montana) Ill 
P2d 267 in which case the court said lien statutes should 
receive a liberal construction in order to effectuate their 
purpose. 
It is stated in 40 C.J. p. 219 and subsequent pages as 
follows: 
"The Courts are liberal in upholding imperfect de-
scriptions, and are reluctant to set aside a mechanics' 
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lien claim, merely because of a loose description of 
the property. The test generally applied in deter-
mining the sufficiency of the description is whether 
it will enable one familiar with the locality to identify 
the property upon which the lien is intended to be 
claimed with reasonable certainty. Facts taken into 
consideration in determ.ining the sufficiency of the 
description are that the person sought to be charged 
could not have been misled." 
Most certainly neither Mecham nor respondent could 
have been misled in this case. We find in 57 CJS Me-
chanics' Liens, Sec. 185, p. 736, the following: 
"It does not attach to land on which no lienable im-
provement has been made, nor does it ordinarily ex-
tend to land which is outside of, and distinct from 
the part or parcel on which the building or improve-
ments stands; but the inclusion in the lien statement 
of land on which no improvement has been made does 
not invalidate the lien as to the improved land." 
And in this same text, Sec. 161, p. 685 we find the 
following: 
"As a general rule the fact that the claim or statement 
describes more land than is subject to the lien does 
not defeat the lien as to the land properly subject 
thereto if there is no fraudulent intent and no one is 
injured thereby." 
There is no showing of any in jury to anyone in the 
instant cases because appellant liened property not im-
proved. Neither does it appear that there was any fraudulent 
intent on the part of appellant in its having liened all the 
property, appellant having used the descriptions contained 
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In the form of lien waiver furnished to appellant by re-
spondent. 
NAMED OWNERS OF PROPERTY 
Appellant described many owners as the reputed owners 
of the properties affected by the lien. It is evident that 
because of the manner in which title to the various properties 
was taken that it was impossible for appellant to identify a 
particular tract as being owned by a certain owner, this 
was especially true because Mecham and respondent both 
treated the construction at all times as one in the matter 
of improving the properties. A lien is not invalid if 
parties other than the owners are named as purported owners 
so long as the owner is named. Sec. 38-1-7 UCA 1953 re-
quires name of owner to be given only if known. 
In 57 CJS, Sec. 45, at page 538 the law is stated as 
follows: 
"When labor or materials are furnished to a con-
tractor engaged in the construction of several build-
ings for different owners, each building with the lot 
on which it' stands may be subject to a lien for ma-
terials used, in, or labor expended on it, even though 
according to but not all authorities, the labor and 
materials were furnished indiscriminately for use in 
the construction of the several buildings." 
Neither the Schauerhamer, Rowley or LaMesa areas 
were subdivided therefore it would have taken an engineer 
to determine the location of a house with any particular 
description. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE 
BUILDING OF HOUSES IN EACH OF THE AREAS COV-
ERED BY THE LIEN OF APPELLANT WAS TREATED 
IN ALL RESPECTS AS ONE ENTIRE PROJECT, AND 
THAT IT WAS ONE PROJECT INSOFAR AS THE 
RIGHTS OF APPELLANT IS AFFECTED. 
It is apparent from the evidence that it would have 
been impossible for any of the lien claimants to designate 
the amount of their lien as against any particular property, 
this is especially true as to the Lal\1esa area in which the 
evidence shows that the metes and bounds descriptions used 
in the mortgages by respondent do not fit the lots as platted 
in the plat which was not filed until some time after con-
struction had been commenced in this area. Neither was 
a plat of the property filed in the Schauerhamer area when 
mortgages were filed and work was going on in that area, 
nor was a plat filed on the Rowley area. Therefore had ap-
pellant attempted to designate a particular amount against 
a particular lot in the LaMesa area or followed the descrip-
tions used by respondent in its mortgages there would have 
been discrepancies between the description and the plot 
plan. This discrepency exists in the LaMesa mortgages. 
The method of building adopted and carried out by the 
contractor, Mecham was a mass production and assembly 
line method. Mecham was keeping his crews busy. As 
the excavators prepared some properties for the building 
of houses they would move to another area and another and 
another, then they would come back to areas from ,vhich they 
had previously moved, the san1e n1ethod was used as to each 
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mechanic. Plumbers roughed in houses in one area then 
moved to another area, then as houses were constructed to a 
point where finishing plumbing and fixtures were needed, 
those materials were taken from the stockpile and used in 
that house which was made ready, some in each area were 
being finished at the same time. It is evident that plun1bing 
materials were being delivered at one and the same time 
to the two points of delivery and from each stockpile plun1b-
ing materials were taken and used in each area. Some of 
the sewer pipe furnished by appellant was cast iron and some 
was transit pipe, cast iron is almost twice the cost of transit 
pipe. Appellant had no knowledge as to that material used 
in any particular house. Mecham's men would drive 
Mecham's truck to the stockpile and take the material to be 
used from the point where it had been delivered. There 
were times when a part of a delivery made by appellant 
some by freight line and some by appellant's own trucks was 
left at each of the stockpiles. Appellant's agent being con-
cerned about the manner in which plumbing materials were 
being taken from each stockpile and used in each area in-
quired of Mecham, the contractor, if appellant should not 
make some designation as to where plumbing materials 
were being used or to be used and a segregation of accounts 
as to same and he was advised by Mecham that it was 
not necessary, that it made no difference. Mecham did 
not keep a record as to where plumbing materials were 
being used as same were taken from each stockpile, nor did 
he require his workmen to make a record as to same. No 
one could tell with any degree of accuracy the amount or 
value of plumbing materials which went into each house. 
Had appellant delivered only bathtubs, showers, basins and 
water closets there would be no problem but in addition 
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to same appellant also delivered roughing in materials, 
sewer pipe, valves etc. 
Even if the trial court were not in error in having re-
fused to find that respondent was the owner of this property, 
this does not make appellant's lien invalid, because it is 
admitted Mecham was the contractor doing the building on 
each area. Mecham admitted there was hut one contract 
between him and appellant covering materials furnished by 
appellant on each of the areas. He admitted that there was 
but one account. 
It is evident under the facts of these cases and the 
admissions of Mr. Mecham, the contractor, that appellant 
had no alternative but to lien all the properties in which its 
materials were used and admitted by Mecham to have been 
used. The fact that the properties were noncontiguous does 
not invalidate the lien of appellant as was the holding of 
the Oklahoma Court in Parker v Walker, 48 Okla. 705, 150 
P. 690, 10 ALR 1022 in which the court said: 
"The syllabus of the court was that 'where a single 
entire contract is made with the materialman to 
furnish material for building houses on noncontigu-
ous lots, and no request is made to keep separate 
accounts of the material which is used in the several 
houses, one lien claim rna y be filed against all of the 
lots and buildings for which the lien claimant has 
furnished material which has actually gone into the 
buildings." 
From the above case it is evident that the real test is, 
did Mecham consider and treat the contract which he made 
with appellant as one entire contract in his dealings with 
appellant. This ~1echam did do. It further appears from 
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the Parker case, supra that the manner in which the party 
deals with the materialman is the controlling factor. 
Because of the manner in which appellant's materials 
were ordered and used by Mecham, appellant's lien must 
necessarily be against each of the properties. Respond-
ent and Mecham both considered that appellant had lien 
rights against all of the properties, this is clearly evident 
because of the request for the lien waiver which was pre-
pared by respondent and which described all of the properties 
liened by appellant. 
Appellant's contention is supported by Sec. 38-1-4 UCA 
1953, supra. 
In these cases the court is not called upon to determine 
from conflicting evidence whether or not the operation was 
treated as one this because Mecham testified to the fact 
that it was one account and one contract as between him 
and appellant. Mecham's method of operation was assembly 
line method and this was admitted by Mr. Grow. The 
admissions by Mecham of the fact that it was one account 
and one contract with appellant is binding upon respondent. 
As to the method used in stockpiling plumbing materials 
by Mecham and the use made of same we quote a few ex-
cerpts from Mecham's testimony, page 250: 
Q. You have testified Bob, that you had a shop 
where cabinets were fabricated in the Keyridge area. 
A. Yes. 
Q. How long did the shop-strike that, please. 
How many men were working in the shop at the time 
it was located on the Keyridge property? 
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A. About four men. We had three or four full 
time men, ... 
Q. Now, for what porperties did you do fabri-
cating work in the shop while the shop was located 
in Key ridge? 
A. We did it for Keyridge. Of course, Schauer-
harner, some for the Rowley houses, and I even 
think we did some for LaMesa. I would have to 
check that. 
Q. Now how many houses had planters? 
A. Practically all of the houses did. 
Q. When you say "all the houses", you mean 
all the houses in Keyridge, the Schauerhamer houses, 
and the Rowley houses? 
A. Yes, most of the houses we built had 
planters. 
Q. Did that include some of the LaMesa 
houses? 
A. Yes, it would. 
P.254 
Q. Do you know the date on which you first 
ordered materials to be delivered on the Rowley 
homes? 
A. I don't have the exact date. I do know that 
we started around the first of February, and the 
materials were ordered from then on for those 
houses. 
Q. Give us your best judgment of the first day 
that materials would have been ordered and de-
livered for the Rowley houses. 
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A. Some materials had been delivered to the 
shop for the Rowley houses prior to construction 
in any amount on the Rowley houses. They had 
been delivered to the shop so it could be locked up. 
Q. When did those deliveries commence? 
A. I would say right around the lst of Feb-
ruary. 
Q. Would you say that they had been made 
by the I st of February? 
A. Yes I would say so. 
Q. Will you describe the shop please? The 
one that was locat~d on the LaMesa property? 
A. This is a block building with a cement floor 
which had been used for a fruit packing shed, which 
I bought along with the ground in LaMesa from 
the Rowley people, and which, eventually~ 've set 
up for our shop. 
Q. And materials were delivered to that build-
ing on the LaMesa property by February lst, 1956? 
A. That is my belief. The reason for it is 
materials could be locked up in that particular 
building. 
Q. Now, do you know if any of the materials 
that were delivered to that building ultimately found 
their way into the houses on the LaMesa property? 
A. I could state that some did. 
P.258 
Q. What arrangements did you have regarding 
plumbing supplies? 
A. For some time in Keyridge we had a dou-
ble garage set up for the storage of plumbing supplies. 
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We used this as a central depot, so to speak, for our 
supplies the houses in Keyridge; also Schauerham-
er, and some of this went over on the first Rowley 
houses. 
Q. Did you have any point of delivery for 
plumbing supplies, at any time, other than the point 
of delivery in Keyridge? 
A. Yes, eventually, we delivered plumbing 
supplies into LaMesa. 
Q. Where in LaMesa were the plumbing sup-
plies delivered? 
A. Originally they were delivered to the shop, 
because it could be locked. Eventually, when a 
double garage wasl prepared so it could be locked, 
they were delivered to that garage. 
Q. What happened to the materials after they 
were delivered to the garage? 
A. The plumbers used one of the trucks we had 
there a good part of the time. They could come with 
their truck to the central location, pick up what they 
needed for a given house, and take it to that house 
and install it. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO FIND AND DETERMINE THAT ROBERT B. ME-
CHAM WAS AGENT FOR MID-UTAH BROADCASTING 
COMPANY, GROW INVESTMENT AND MORTGAGE 
COMPANY, AND RADIO SALES CORPORATION 
WHICH COMPANIES THROUGH THEIR AGENT~ D. 
SPENCER GROW CONSTRUCTED HOUSES IN KEY-
RIDGE 1-IEIGHTS SUBDIVISION AND SCHAUER-
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HAMER SUBDIVISION AND THAT SAID MID-UTAH 
BROADCASTING COMPANY FAILED TO REQUIRE 
ROBERT B. MECHAM, THEIR AGENT, TO FURNISH A 
PERFORMANCE BOND IN CONFORMITY WITH TITLE 
14-2-2 UCA, 1953, AND THEREFORE, SAID MID-UTAH 
BROADCASTING COMPANY BECAME LIABLE TO i\P-
PELLANT FOR MATERIALS FURNISHED TO THAT 
PROPERTY AFFECTED BY CASE NO. 20,591 DESIG-
NATED AS SCHAUERHAMER AREA. 
There is no contradiction of the fact that lots in the 
Keyridge area were owned by companies owned or controlled 
by D. Spencer Grow, certain ones of his companies holding 
title to certain designated lots and that Robert B. Mecham 
was constructing houses in the Keyridge area for each owner 
at one and the same time without regard as to which company 
held title to any particular lot. There is no contradiction of 
the fact that appellant furnished plumbing materials to 
Mecham for these construction jobs as early as June 6, 1956 
and that while Mecham was building in the Keyridge area he 
fanned out into the Schauerhamer area where he commenced 
some construction work on his own, he did, however convey 
some of these properties to Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company 
and also built homes for this same company in that area. 
Therefore under Title 14-2-2 UCA 1953, appellant was en-
titled to judgment against Mid-Utah Broadcasting Company 
even if the lien of appellant as to this property was invalid. 
It is further evident that respondent company did the 
financing of the building of these properties and that re-
spondent loaned Grow's companies enough money on each 
of the Keyridge houses to not only pay for the construction 
of the house but to pay for the lot. 
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Respondent admits that a portion of the Schauer-
harner property was acquired by some of Grow's companies 
and built upon at the same time building was going on in 
the Keyridge area. It is evident that some of Ludlow's mate-
rials went into this property which evidence is undisputed. 
It is also evident that Grow's company Mid-Utah Broadcast-
ing Co. took title at a subsequent date, to those properties in 
Schauerhamer in which title had been taken in the name of 
Mecham and this was before the buildings thereon had been 
completed. 
The evidence in these cases shows without a doubt that 
respondent is the real party in interest and the owner of the 
properties affected and designated as Rowley and LaMesa 
areas. Should the court not agree, however, with this state-
ment we refer to those authorities treating the cases here-
tofore cited in which a contractor does work on several build-
ings for different owners which is not unusual at the present 
time. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO FIND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM TOOK TITLE TO 
PROPERTIES DESIGNATED AS ROWLEY AND LaMESA 
FOR AND ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT AND THAT 
RESPONDENT WAS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 
AND THAT ROBERT B. MECHAM WAS THE AGENT 
FOR RESPONDENT AND RESPONDENT FAILED TO 
REQUIRE ROBERT B. MECHAM, THEIR AGENT, TO 
FURNISH A PERFORMANCE BOND IN CONFORMITY 
WITH TITLE 14-2-2 UCA, 1953, AND THAT APPELLANT 
IS THEREFORE ENTITLED TO PERSONAL JUDGMENT 
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AGAINST RESPONDENT AS THE SAME AFFECTS THE 
PROPERTIES SITUATED IN THE ROWLEY AND La-
MESA AREAS. 
It is appellant's contention which is amply supported by 
the evidence that while title to the various properties in these 
areas did appear vested of record in other na1nes, the real 
party in interest at all times was respondent, respondent was 
the party who furnished all monies not only for the construc-
tion of houses on the properties hut also for the purchase of 
the properties. The evidence conclusively shows that re-
spondent furnished more than the total cost of the real estate 
and the contract price for the building thereon on the Key-
ridge property. Respondent financed the building on the 
Schauerhamer properties and respondent furnished all mon-
ies with which the Rowley and LaMesa properties \vere 
acquired. 
The evidence shows that when Mecham went into the 
Rowley and LaMesa areas he was so heavily in debt that he 
was unable to complete the construction of the houses con-
tracted to he built in either the Keyridge area or in the 
Schauerhamer area, he had to get more land on which to 
raise money in order to use that money toward completion 
of houses for Grow in the Keyridge and Schauerhamer areas. 
lVIecham testified to the fact that he had no money when 
he negotiated with Rowleys for the acquisition of the Lal\Iesa 
property, that he made the payment called for by the contract 
out of monies furnished to him by respondent. He testified 
to the fact that he was instructed by Grow as agent of respond-
ent to do the negotiating for the property and to take title or 
enter into a contract for the purchase of the property in his 
(Mecham's) name and that respondent would furnish the 
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money. This was done. Respondent was the real party 
in interest and being such is liable to appellant should the 
judgment of the trial court as to the question of the validity 
of appellant's lien be affirmed. The same is true as to the 
four Rowley lots. 
It is evident that the plan was to build in the LaMesa 
area and move into that area during construction in the Key-
ridge and Schauerhamer areas. The plot plan was delayed 
in filing and building permits could not be had for the 
LaMesa area. Mecham wanted to keep his crew busy and 
while waiting for approval of the plot plan for LaMesa 
he negotiated with Rowleys for the four lots across the 
street from LaMesa. Respondent furnished the money for 
this purchase. Grow was doing the very thing which Me-
cham testified he had agreed to do when Mecham found 
he was losing money in the Keyridge area, that was to get 
more property for Mecham to build on at a higher contract 
price. 
The evidence shows that Grow was at all times the pres-
ident of respondent company and the controlling stockholder 
therein, that he was president and controlling stockholder in 
each of the companies which held title to various properties, 
that he sat on the loan committee and approved loans to each 
of his companies by respondent company, that three out of 
every four loan~ made by respondent were made to Grow 
companies and that 95% of the construction loans made 
by respondent were made to Grow's companies. 
The evidence further shows that respondent advanced 
$30,000 out of Lal\tlesa mortgages before any work \ras 
started in that area. The 1noney from LaMesa loans instead 
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of going into construction of houses in that area was used 
to bring Grow's Keyridge and Schauerhamer houses nearer 
to a point of completion. 
It is evident that Grow observed materials being stock-
piled on the Keyridge and LaMesa areas, that he observed 
same being taken from those stockpiles and being used at 
each area, that Grow made no objection to such method of 
construction by Mecham. And why should Grow object to 
such method, his company, respondent herein was the party 
to be benefited and to be affected by such method of 
operation. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO APPLY THE EQUITABLE EQUAL APPORTIONABLE 
RULE. 
Section 38-1-3 UCA 1953, which is applicable is here-
inabove set out omitting the verbiage. 
It is evident without contradiction that appellant furn-
ished plumbing materials which went into that improved 
property liened and upon which appellant seeks a foreclosure 
and it is further evident without contradiction that the plumb-
ing materials were furnished either to the owner or to the 
agent for the owner acting by authority of the owner. 
The difficulty with which appellant was confronted in 
not being able to designate or specify that material which 
went into each house was not of appellant's own making. 
Appellant followed instructions and orders in making de-
livery of its materials to the stockpile of materials at two 
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convenient points, it had no control over the plumbing mate-
rials after delivery was so made. No one could determine 
with any degree of certainty whether the waste lines are 
of galvanized steel or transit pipe without uncovering same, 
nor can it be determined what the length of same is, neither 
can it be determined as to the number of L' s or joints which 
are buried. Without appellant being able to specify with some 
degree of certainty the value of the materials which went 
into each house it is required under the statute to place a 
blanket lien on all of the property on which its materials 
were used. 
Then too even if appellant could have specified the 
amount of materials which went into each house it would 
have been most difficult to designate who the owner was 
because so many different owners appear of record, espe-
cially is this true as to the Keyridge area, and the metes 
and bounds descriptions in the LaMesa area do not fit the 
plot plan which was not filed until a time after appellant 
had filed its lien. 
In support of appellant's argument regarding this point 
reference is made to the Brannan case cited under point I, 
Jones on Liens Vol. II, Sec. 1319 and Thompson on Real 
Property, Per. Ed. Vol. 10, Sec. 5432, p. 432 both of 
,vhich authorities are quoted from under point I herein, also 
Sec. 38-1-3 UCA 1953, supra. 
It is evident from these authorities that a court may 
apply the rule and apportion the amount equally as to each 
property where the lien claimant cannot do so, especially 
where the contractor adn1its that appellant's materials went 
into the properties. At the trial of the cases appellant 
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requested the trial court to adopt and apply the rule in the 
following manner. There are 52 improved properties in 
all affected by appellant's lien, 24 of which are located 
in the LaMesa area, 6 of which are located in the Shauer-
hanler area, 4 of which are located in the Row ley area, 
all covered by mortgages held by respondent which are being 
foreclosed on in the three cases here before the court. The 
original lien designated the amount owing and claimed to 
be due in the sum of $18,653.67. It appeared at the trial 
that an error of $62.7 4 was made in the amount and that 
the same included interest in the sum of $~291.64, which 
Mecham agreed to pay, but appellant reduced its claim in 
these amounts leaving an amount as claimed of $18,299.29, 
with attorney's fees of $25.00 makes a total of $18,324.29, 
divided by 52 being the total number of lots makes the sum 
of $352.12 per lot, there being a total of 34 lots affected 
by the three cases here before the court the court should have 
found appellant's lien superior to respondent's mortgages 
and the court should have granted appellant judgment of 
foreclosure of its lien in the sum of $352.12 as against each 
lot affected by respondent's mortgages or a total in the three 
cases of $11,972.08. The priority of appellant's lien over the 
mortgages dating back to the time of delivery of materials 
to the Keyridge area from which the whole operation fanned 
out. 
This position is supported by Sec. 38-1-5, UCA 1953 
which provides as follows: 
"The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, 
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement 
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the 
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structure or improvement, and shall have priority 
over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which 
may have attached subsequently to the time when the 
building, improvement or structure was commenced, 
work begun, or first material furnished on the 
ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other encum-
brance of which the lien holder had no notice and 
which was unrecorded at the time the building struc-
ture or improvement was commenced, work begun, 
or first material furnished on the ground." 
There are ll lots affected by appellant's lien pending 
in another action which lots are located in the Keyridge area, 
six lots in the Schauerhamer area and one lot in the City of 
Provo which appellant must look to for the balance of its 
claim. 
It is evident that appellant is not seeking to burden 
any particular lot or any particular area with the whole 
amount of its lien or in an amount in excess of that portion 
of the lien allocated to each lot. It would be much to 
the advantage of appellant were the rule otherwise so that 
appellant could have filed its lien on one area in the full 
amount of its lien. 
It is apparent the above rule was applied by the court 
as to those other lien claimants in this action in whose favor 
the court ruled as the same affected the LaMesa area and 
Geneva Products lien which was apportioned bet,\·een LaMesa 
and Rowley areas. Those claimants were not required to 
specify the amount of their lien claimed against each one of 
the 24 lots located in the LaMesa area, and even though the 
amount of Geneva's claim as to the Rowley area '\Tas stip-
ulated to, the equal apportionn1ent rule was applied by the 
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court, still the court refused to apply the same rule in 
favor of the appellant. 
From the above authorities and statute it is apparent 
that appellant must rely on the equitable doctrine provided 
for such cases and ask the court to make the apportionment 
to appellant's claim. 
As to the overstatement of the amount of appellant's 
lien it was as a result of an innocent mistake with no intent 
to defraud. No one was misled or prejudiced thereby. And 
as stated in 57 CJS Sec. 153, subsection B. page 676 under 
such facts the lien may be enforced. 
In the application of this rule it poses no problem in the 
foreclosure proceeding as Sec. 38-1-15 UCA 1953 provides 
for the sale of the property in satisfaction of the lien and 
costs as in the case of foreclosure of mortgages. 
POINT VI. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUSING 
TO DECREE THAT THE MORTGAGES INVOLVED IN 
EACH OF SAID ACTIONS WERE INVALID AS TO AP-
PELLANT, THE SAME NOT HAVING BEEN EXECUTED 
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The evidence shows that Mrs. Robert Mecham ap-
peared personally upon only one occasion to sign mortgages 
at the offices of the Utah Savings and Loan Associ~tion and 
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that on all other occasions, by the admission of the plaintiff, 
the mortgages were signed by her outside of the presence of 
the notary and that the proof of signature was telephoned 
to Mrs. Gardner an employee of respondent and, in turn, 
relayed to Mrs. Peterson, also an employee of respondent. 
The mortgages therefore did not impart notice to the lien 
claimants at the time of their recording the acknowledgments 
were not conforming with the statutory requirements. 
The statutory provisions regarding this point are as 
follows: 
57-2-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, FORM OF CER-
TIFICATE OF ACKNOWLED·GMENT. 
"A certificate of acknowledgment to any in-
strument in writing affecting the title to any real 
property in this state may be substantially in the 
following form: 
Sate of Utah, County of ----------------------------
On the ________ day of ________________ , 19 ______ , person-
ally appeared before me ______________________________________ , the 
signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowl-
edged to me that he executed the same." 
57-3-l, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. CERTIFICATE 
OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OR OF PROOF OF EX-
ECUTION A PREREQUISITE. 
"'A certificate of the acknowledgment of any 
conveyance., or of the proof of the execution thereof 
as provided in this title. signed and certified by the 
officer taking the same as provided in this title, shall 
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entitle such conveyance with the certificate or certi-
ficates aforesaid, to be recorded in the office of the 
recorder of the county in which the real estate is 
situated.'' (Italics supplied) 
57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. RECORD IM-
p ARTS NOTICE. 
"Every conveyance, or instrument in writing af-
fecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, 
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, 
and every patent to lands . . . shall, from the time of 
filing the same with the recorder of record, impart 
notice to all persons of the contents thereof, and 
subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lienholders 
shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice." 
(Italics supplied) 
57-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, MANNER OF 
ACKNOWLEDGING OR PROVING CONVEY-
ANCES. 
"Every conveyance in writing whereby any 
real estate is conveyed or may be affected shall be 
acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner 
hereinafter provided." 
57-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, RECORDING 
NECESSARY TO IMPART NOTICE-OPERATION 
AND EFFECT INTEREST OF PERSON NOT 
NAMED IN INSTRUMENT. 
"Every conveyance of real estate and every in-
strument of writing setting forth an agreement to con-
vey any real estate or whereby any real estate may be 
effected, to operate as notice to third persons shall he 
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proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner 
prescribed by this title and recorded in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which such real estate 
is situated, but shall be valid and binding between 
the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledg-
ment, certification or record, and as to all other per-
sons who have had actual notice." (Italics supplied) 
I Am. Jur. Sec. 69 states: 
"While there is some authority to the effect that 
in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, an ac-
knowledgment may be taken over a telephone, a 
rna jority of the few cases discussing the question 
hold that where the personal presence of a party be-
fore an officer is required by the statute, an acknowl-
edgment cannot be taken over a telephone." 
The following cases are in point. 
Myers v. Eby, 33 Idaho 266, I93 P 77; 
Roach v. Francisco, I38 Tenn. 357, I97 S.W. I099, 
I A.L.R. I074; 
Annot. I2 A.L.R. 538; 58 A.L.R. 604; 
Humble Oil and Ref. Co. v. Downey, I43 Tex. 577, 
I83 s.w. 2d 426; 
Charlton v. Richard Gill Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 285 
s.w. 2d 80I. 
Reference is also made to 59 A.L.R. 2d 1293, with 
Annotations beginning on page 1301, ( I315) where nu-
merous cases are cited holding that latent defects in an ac-
knowledginent prevents constructive notice. The principal 
case cited in this annotation, Citizens National Bank in 
Zanesville, Appt. v. Bertha G. Denison, et al, I33 N.E. 2d 
329, deals with priorities between mortgage holders the 
author says: 
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"That the recording of a defectively acknowl-
edged mortgage did not constitute constructive notice 
to the subsequent mortgagees and give it priority over 
the subsequently recorded mortgages; and that the 
defective execution could be proved by evidence of 
defects not apparent on the face of the instrument." 
See also 25 A.L.R. 2d 1124, for additional annotated 
cases and specifically Section 49 thereof, page 1166, which, 
among other cases, refers to Litile v. Bergdahl Oil Company, 
60 Idaho 662, 95 P 2d 833, which held that: 
"In the absence of the identical person who 
signed the instrument an officer cannot accept the 
affidavit of a witness to the signature and then, upon 
such affidavit alone, take the acknowledgment." 
In the case of Myers v. Eby supra, the facts were almost 
identical with the case in point in that the signature of one 
of the mortgagors was affixed to the mortgage outside of 
the presence of the justice of the peace who notarized the 
document and the justice called the mortgagor and confirn1ed 
the signature by telephone. The court in that case said: 
"Where the personal presence of a party before 
an officer is a requirement of the statute, an acknow 1-
edgment of a person not in the presence of the officer, 
taken by means of the telephone, is not a mere irregu-
larity. It is beyond the power of the officer to take 
an acknowledgment in this manner. The recitals in 
the certificate become a mere fabrication." 
See: LeMesnager, et al v. Hamilton, 101 Cal, 532, 
35 Pac. 1054. 
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See Tarpey v. Deseret Salt Co, 5 Utah 205, 14 Pac. 338. 
\vhich states: 
"One object of the acknowledgment is to entitle 
the deed to be recorded but the record is only the 
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The 
certificate of acknowledgment is itself only prima 
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. It is not 
conclusive and rna y be rebutted." 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING AND REFUS-
ING TO FIND THAT BECAUSE OF THE CONDUCT OF 
RESPONDENT IN EACH OF SAID ACTIONS RESPOND-
ENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING ANY RIGHTS AS 
BEING PRIOR AND SUPERIOR TO THE RIGHTS OF 
APPELLANT. 
The argument contained in next to last paragraph under 
appellant's Point VI may also be applied and argued under 
this point. 
Appellant pleaded and relies upon the doctrine of equit-
able estoppel in the instant cases. From the acts and conduct 
of respondent, regardless of which conclusion the court might 
come to under the various contentions of respondent, respond-
ent should be estopped from either challenging the validity 
of appellant's lien or of claiming priority over same. The 
instant cases are equity cases. Respondent has not come 
into court with clean hands. If there was ever a case in which 
this doctrine should be applied it appears that this is such 
a case. 
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It appears that respondent has taken a most inconsistent 
position in these cases. Respondent contends for one theory 
a~ against this appellant, and the opposite theory as against 
the other lien claimants. 
Respondent was responsible for the manner in which 
construction was carried on. Grow the agent of respondent 
knew during the construction of homes in the Keyridge area 
that Mecham was losing money so what did Grow do, he 
told Mecham to get additional properties on which to build 
and that he would contract with Grow on those houses at a 
higher figure than had been contracted for on the Keyridge 
area. Mecham did this. Grow pursuaded Mecham to mort-
gage the Schauerhamer lots to respondent company and told 
Mecham that respondent would finance the purchase of addi-
tional properties which could be mortgaged. The mortgage 
monies from these additional properties were used at least in 
part to bring houses in Grow's controlled companies areas 
to a more near completion. Mecham was in debt $119,000 
and the scheme was to get more property on which more 
mortgages could be placed, the proceeds from which the old 
bills would be paid first. 
Grow as agent for respondent stood by and observed 
materialmen stockpiling materials some on Keyridge prop-
erty in the name of his controlled company and some on 
LaMesa in the name of Mecham. He further observed the 
taking of plumbing materials from each stockpile and its 
being used in buildings in each area. As to this fact a 
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Q. Mr. Mecham, did you see Mr. Grow on and 
about the areas in which you were building during 
the course of construction of these buildings? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Grow on and about the 
properties during the period of time that workmen 
were working around the areas? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Grow on or about the 
properties during the period of time when plumbing 
materials were being taken from stock piles on 
Keyridge and used on other projects? 
A. Yes, I am sure. 
Q. Did you see Mr. Grow in and about the La-
Mesa area when plumbing materials were being taken 
from the stock pile on LaMesa and used in other 
areas? 
A. Yes, I saw Mr. Grow on the property at 
that time. 
Q. Did Mr. Grow ever request you or inquire 
of you whether you were making any segregation of 
materials that were going into these various areas? 
A. No, he didn't. 
Q. Did Mr. Grow ever ask you to make a segre-
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It is evident that respondent was not obligated to ad-
vance mortgage monies as the trial court rightly held. Neither 
did respondent advance to Mecham, the contractor, or if he 
was in fact the owner, 100% of the amount of the mortgage, 
nor \vere the mortgages credited with the 10% withheld by 
respondent from each of the LaMesa mortgages until the 
day of the opening of trial. The amount withheld by re-
spondent and credited on the first day of trial was $32,400.00. 
Had respondent been obligated to advance said sum and 
had such sum been made available to Mecham during the 
course of construction of houses in the four areas we have 
a right to presume appellant would not have been confronted 
with the mess which causes us to bring this case before the 
Supreme Court. 
While the mortgages foreclosed by respondent might 
in law be enforceable as against Mecham, they are not such 
as entitles the mortgages to priority over the lien of a p-
pellant. 
Respondent controlled the release of the monies rep-
resented by the mortgages and directed the manner in which 
payment was to be made and to whom the monies were to be 
paid. Respondent, and respondent only determined which 
account monies drawn by Mecham against the mortgages were 
to be charged. If the properties were some Mecham's and 
some respondent's or Grow's companies as respondent con-
tends then it was the duty of respondent to have requested 
that appellant segregate its accounts and to require a record 
and charging out of materials which were going into those 
properties owned by respondent and those properties owned 
by Mecham. There is no contradition of the fact that no 
records were kept by Mecham or by any of his men as 
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plumbing materials were taken from each stockpile and used 
in each area. Nor was Mecham ever instructed by Grow 
a~ agent for respondent to keep such a record or to segregate 
the accounts. 
The descriptions used by appellant in its lien were 
those furnished by respondent to appellant in the lien 
waiver which respondent requested appellant's agents to sign 
and which they refused to do. No one but an engineer could 
take the descriptions furnished by respondent and find a 
particular lot and point out with any degree of accuracy the 
particular lot as fitting a particular description. The plat 
on the LaMesa area was not filed until a time after ap-
pellant filed its lien. The Rowley property was never 
platted? Nor was the Scha uerhamer property platted as 
a subdivision. 
The evidence conclusively shows that Mecham was 
but a tool in the hands of Grow who was acting at all times 
on behalf of and for respondent. It is clearly evident that 
the placing of title in the name of various companies by 
Grow and the method of operation and of having Mecham 
take title to LaMesa and Rowley areas in his name, was all 
a scheme by and through which the rights of materialmen 
and creditors would be and were defeated. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case so strongly shows that because 
of the acts and conduct of agents of respondent respondent 
should be estopped from questioning the validity of appel-
lant\ lien or claiming its rights as being superior to that of 
appellant that the court need not concern itself, in the opinion 
of appeJ I ant., with the oth('r points upon which appellant re-
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lies any one of which if the court should rule in favor of ap-
pellant will establish appellant's right to a foreclosure of 
its lien and which should establish the lien as superior to 
that of respondent's mortgage. 
If the court however, does not apply estoppel in favor 
of appellant an~ should the court not find and determine 
that Mecham in fact held title to Rowley and LaMesa areas 
for respondent but that Mecham was the true owner, such 
determination still will not defeat the lien of appellant inas-
much as appellant was dealing at all times with Mecham, 
the owner builder. Then too, such defense could not be 
relied on by respondent as to the Schauerhamer area owned 
by Mid-Utah Construction Co. on which area Mecham had 
contracted to build for Mid-Utah. 
In the Schauerhamer area appellant could not have kept 
track of the way title to these properties were being juggled 
around. It is evident that Mecham took title to a part of the 
property in his name first, then Mid-Utah Construction 
Company took title to that part of the property which had 
been held in Mecham's name and which had not been sold. 
Appellant was at all times dealing with Mecham the con-
tractor. 
Respondent cannot defeat the lien of appellant no matter 
how bad it might be without first establishing the validity 
of its mortgages, this because unless respondent can bring 
itself into a class of lien claimants it has no right to question 
the lien of appellant. Appellant's action to foreclose its 
lien is against Mecham. It is Mecham against whom a p-
pellant seeks a deficiency judgment unless appellant estab-
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lishes the fact that respondent and not Mecham is the true 
owner of the properties. 
Section 38-l-8 UCA 1953 gives appellant the right 
to lien any and all property which has received its mate-
rials under a single contract with Mecham, this is true 
whether delivered to the owner or the agent of the owner, 
and under section 38-l-4 UCA 1953 the properties whether 
two or more lots or subdivisions is one for the purpose of 
establishing appellant's lien. The contractor, materialman 
relationship is the determining factor, one ownership is not 
necessary. 
There was no showing that anyone has been misled 
by the description as contained in appellant's lien nor has 
it been shown that anyone has been prejudiced as a result 
of appellant's claiming all properties which received its ma-
terials under one lien. Mecham has not objected to such 
procedure. 
The judgment of the district court should be reversed 
and the lien of appellant should be found and determined 
to be valid and superior to the rights of respondent and a 
foreclosure of the lien should he ordered and a sale of the 
properties out of which the proceeds of the sale should be 
applied equally to the lots affected by the three actions here 
before the court as to that proportionate amount of the lien 
affected by these actions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
M. V. BACKMAN of 
BACKMAN, BACKMAN & CLARK, 
Auorneys for Appellant. 
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